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 The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 
571 (6th Cir. 2018), that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and 
transitioning status is necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex” 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is under review as part of 
a triad of cases recently argued before the Supreme Court. Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Bostock v. Clayton 
Cty. Bd. of Comm’r., 723 F. App’x 964 No. 17-13801 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(mem.). On Tuesday, October 8, 2019, the nine Justices heard oral 
arguments in cases about whether a federal law that prohibits 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” covers discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and sexual identity.  
 In R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, a longtime employee of the 
funeral home, Aimee Stephens, was fired after informing her boss that 
she intended to live and work as a woman and would eventually have sex-
reassignment surgery. The owner of the funeral home, Thomas Rost, 
explicitly justified the firing because he would be “violating God’s 
commands if [he] were to permit one of [the funeral home’s] funeral 
directors to deny their sex while acting as a representative of [the] 
organization.” Id. at 569. The consolidated cases from the 2nd and 11th 
Circuits, Zarda and Bostock, involve two men, one a skydiving instructor 
and the other child-welfare-services coordinator in Clayton County, 
Georgia, who argue that they were fired for being gay. 
All three cases revolve around two key arguments: one purely 
textual and one based on precedent. The central textual argument is that 
discrimination because of someone’s gender identity or sexual 
orientation is, by definition, “because of . . . sex.” They are also arguing 
that, even if the textual argument fails, the discrimination is clearly within 
the precedent set in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which held that 
discrimination based on failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms 
is covered under Title VII. 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989). 
Oral arguments (audio recordings can be found here and here) 
centered on the textualist argument. Justice Gorsuch, a potential swing 
vote and staunch conservative, stated that the textual evidence was close, 
signaling that the argument may be successful, but experts are undecided 
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on how this case will come out. Will they decide the same in both cases? 
Is the argument stronger for one case? Are the purported potential social 
impacts and the Justices’ views of judicial activism too insurmountable 
of hurdles? Or did Justice Sotomayor’s wise words during oral argument 
resonate:  
[A]t what point does a court continue to permit 
invidious discrimination against groups that, where we 
have a difference of opinion, we believe the language of 
the statute is clear . . . . At what point does a court say, 
Congress spoke about this, the original Congress who 
wrote this statute told us what they meant. They used clear 
words. And regardless of what others may have thought 
over time it’s very clear that what’s happening fits those 
words.  
 
A decision is unlikely to come until the end of this term in late spring 
or early summer, but no matter what the justices decide, the potential 
impact of their decisions is clear. 
There are three primary ways LGBTQ persons can currently be 
protected from employment discrimination: explicit state law, an 
interpretation of state law that includes gender identity and sexual 
orientation in discrimination because of sex, or a judicial interpretation 
of the federal Title VII statue (at issue here). According to the Movement 
Advancement Project, 56 percent of LGBTQ people are currently living 
in a state with a federal circuit court decision holding that sex 
discrimination includes discrimination based on gender identity. Four 
other circuits in addition to the Sixth Circuit (the First, Seventh, Ninth, 
and Eleventh) have made similar decisions to the one currently before the 
Court. These circuits encompass 23 states—only nine of which have 
separate state law protections prohibiting employment discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity.  
Should the Supreme Court of the United States decide to reverse 
the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., the LGBTQ 
community will lose a primary means of protection from employment 
discrimination—a means of protection relied upon by people in 14 states. 
States with no explicit statutory or common law protections can no longer 
rely upon a judicial interpretation of federal law, leaving LGBTQ people 
in these states with little to no protection or recourse. 
The situation is even more dire when it comes to protection from 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. While the district courts 
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have generally held in favor of the transgender community’s rights, the 
same cannot be said for sexual orientation. Eleven of twelve circuits have 
had to decide this issue, but only two have interpreted “because 
of . . . sex” to include sexual orientation—nine circuits have held 
otherwise. An overwhelming 84 percent of LGBTQ people are currently 
living in a state where a federal circuit court has explicitly held that sex 
discrimination does not include discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. This means that 44 states and the District of Columbia, 
including those in the Sixth Circuit, do not extend the umbrella protection 
of the federal law, and only 17 of those states provide any protection at 
the state level. A vast majority of the LGB community is relying upon a 
favorable Supreme Court decision to ensure any sort of protection at all. 
A decision to the contrary has potentially devastating consequences. 
It has been argued that this is not what Congress intended. It has 
been argued that these cases are different enough that precedent should 
not apply. The textual evidence in support of Aimee Stephens, Donald 
Zarda, and Gerald Bostock can be ignored. The court may push textual 
and precedential arguments aside and argue that the social impact is too 
profound or that extending employment discrimination protections to the 
LGBTQ community is the role of a democratically elected body, not the 
judiciary. But, as Justice Sotomayor posits, perhaps this is a time, like 
numerous times in the past, that invidious discrimination should be 
brought to a halt. Here the case is clear because the text provides an 
answer. Precedent provides an answer. Our social morality provides an 
answer. Let us just hope the Justices agree. 
 
